Why did China block India’s bid to label JeM chief Masood Azhar as a Terrorist?
- In Foreign Policy
- 08:32 AM, Apr 16, 2016
- Ajit Datta
China has vetoed India’s demand at the United Nations Security Council to label Jaish-e-Mohammad founder Masoor Azhar a terrorist. All the other fourteen members of the UNSC supported India’s bid. India is unequivocally certain that Masoor Azhar is the mastermind of the attacks at the Pathankot airbase. Had all fifteen members agreed to India’s demand, Pakistan would have had to restrict Azhar’s movement and freeze his assets. China rendering a favor to its geopolitical ally, with whom it shares a common anti-India worldview, is a simplistic explanation to an action which has several intricacies to its basis.
To begin with, one must understand the metamorphosis of the Indo-Pak relationship in the last one and a half years. India no longer treats Pakistan as one unit. It recognizes the stark divisions between the forces that determine Pakistan’s fate. For the first time, India is dealing with the civilian establishment and the military establishment with completely different outlooks and objectives. The differences between both sides are being exploited, and India’s position in this conflict is gradually changing from that of helplessness to that of strength.
Once again, to understand why that is, one must examine the Pakistani civil and military establishments, each one’s position and objectives, and their differences. The military establishment includes the army, all the country’s security agencies such as the ISI, and some state-sponsored terror organizations. The military establishment has two essential objectives. One, is to always remain stronger than the democratically elected government and continue being the real power behind the throne. And two, is to maintain a hostile atmosphere in regard to India. Why it is that they do not themselves want to occupy the throne, and why they prefer a hostile atmosphere as opposed to actual hostilities, will be dealt with later. The civilian establishment on the other hand, is mostly at the mercy of the generals. They would much rather be independent and powerful. Their objectives, which are covert, are to cut the military to size and bring about peace in the region.
A large part of the military’s raison d’être has been the false impression of a hostile India. The military knows that it is in no position to take on India in a war, both logistically and economically. Therefore, its strategy has been to perpetrate insignificant attacks every now and then. These attacks are just enough to keep the pot boiling, but not to initiate a full-scale war. Since these games with India always go on, there is never an existential threat to the Pakistani military. The reason they do not ask the civilian establishment to take a walk is because at this time, courtesy the civilian establishment, they enjoy several international perks. A military dictator sitting on a nuclear arsenal would attract sanctions as opposed to aid, and would risk international isolation like the Kims of North Korea. The civilian establishment’s twin objectives of cutting the military to size and establishing peace in the region are directly correlated, since the military and its cronies are largely responsible for the region’s distress.
In recent times, the Nawaz Sharif government has clashed with the military establishment on issues of authority. Last month, general Raheel Sharif ordered a Punjab-wide operation against suspected militants and dozens were rounded up during raids. Later, Nawaz Sharif’s government asked the army to stay out of Punjab. Punjab is the prime minister’s home state, and these raids were seen by many as signs of intimidation. That differences such as these between both sides would crop up sooner or later, and that they could be enhanced and used to India’s advantage, is the shrewd calculation Narendra Modi made much before he came to power.
The Modi government’s two pronged strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan has been to engage deeply with the civilian establishment on one side, and to coerce and humiliate the military establishment one the other. On one hand, there were historical photo-ops at the swearing-in ceremony, at Ufa and at the Sharif mansion. Who would have thought that a Pakistani prime minister would attend Mr. Modi’s inauguration or that Mr. Modi would be the first prime minister in 12 years to visit Pakistan? The cultural exchange and the cricketing ties between both countries have also been cordial.
On the other hand, India retaliates with disproportionate firing whenever the military establishment creates a ruckus at the borders. Pressure tactics are used to keep the Kashmiri separatists out of the Indo-Pak narrative. The separatists have been a key weapon of the military establishment, and India successfully manipulated Pakistan to call off the NSA level talks on this basis. Unrest is brewing in Balochistan, and the presence of an Indian hand looks increasingly likely. Just recently, India surprised the military establishment by allowing their Special Investigation Team to visit the Pathankot airbase. The team was shown certain areas of the airbase, asked to hand over Massor Azhar and sent back. Clearly, India is not serious about meaningful engagement with the military.
In fact, this is the whole basis of India’s dichotomy in dealing with Pakistan. The mainstream media may cry foul about it, but they still haven’t learnt to look at Pakistan as two units as opposed to one. India’s stance when it deals with the civilian establishment has been to keep the military establishment out of the discourse. Their reasoning is that since the civilian establishment doesn’t control the military or speak for it, it makes more sense for India to handle the latter separately. But as we have seen, the only treatment the military establishment gets from India is suppressive and meaningless. This complete isolation from the talk process, coupled with the perception of them being an irritant as opposed to an important stakeholder, has put the military establishment in a tight spot.
Now, despite being the power behind the throne, they can neither occupy it nor do much if India chooses to treat them as a menace and actively promote the civilian establishment. For India, this is a long term strategy by which they wish to take the military establishment to a breaking point. The beauty about this is that generals and prime ministers can come and go, but there will be no need to change course. At the end of it, the military will be left with two choices: either take over the country and risk global isolation, or maintain peaceful relations with India and risk its own existence. Either way, India would have successfully achieved the classic ‘divide and conquer’.
It is in this context that China’s vetoing of labelling Massod Azhar as a terrorist should be perceived. China’s alliance with Pakistan is solely due to the latter’s military establishment, and how it has always been a nuisance to India. India taking the Pakistani military to its breaking point would affect Chinese geopolitical calculations gravely. Already, its economy is slowing down and it faces continuous flak for being North Korea’s guardian angel. Supporting a second, even larger military dictatorship is something China cannot afford economically or geopolitically. On the other hand, if the military towed India’s line and refrained from being a nuisance, it would create a huge shortfall in China’s geopolitical agenda. But the Manmohan Singh days are gone, and the best China can do right now is to protect one of the military establishment’s key cronies when the whole world wants his head. Therefore, the veto.
The veto wouldn’t account for much in the long run. If India remains true to its current Pakistan policy, the military establishment will be pushed to a corner and forced to make a tough choice. Our government should be given full marks for a practical, quite out-of-the-box solution to deal with the India’s primary menace.
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