What can we learn from Cuban Missile Crisis?
- In Military & Strategic Affairs
- 09:49 AM, Oct 15, 2016
- Dharmendra Chauhan
A stand-off between nuclear powers is an intimidating problem. Both sides know that outright war will destroy them, but yielding unilaterally also has a huge price in terms of conceding dominant status to the opposition. The best outcome would be a face-saving excuse to deescalate the situation. Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning Soviet ballistic missile deployment in Cuba was exactly that. Known as Cuban Missile Crisis, it lasted 13-day (October 16–28, 1962). Cuba had been a source of growing concern to America since 1959, when Fidel Castro overthrew the Batista regime. Castro's leaning towards Marxism and fear of Soviet foothold in the Western hemisphere - just 90 miles from the beaches of Florida were enough reasons for the concern. Several plots to overthrow Castro financed by his administration and the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion made Kennedy an active enemy of the Cuban government. In the summer of 1962, US spy planes discovered nuclear missile bases under construction in Cuba. They were being built by the Soviets. Deployment of ballistic missiles in Italy and Turkey by US incited Soviets to convince Cuba for construction of missile bases. Election being under way, the White house couldn't ignore this development. US obviously wanted the missile bases removed but it seemed that Soviets would not do so without a threat of war. The Soviets just as obviously wanted the missile bases to stay but to stand firm was to run risk of war. None of them wanted a war, however, both side hoped the other one would back down. As more Soviet ships were approaching Cuba, Kennedy took the hard stand and announced naval blockade of the island. On the Soviet side, Khrushchev also pledged to take "all action that is necessary".
This stand-off started resembling the famous Chicken game. Chicken game involves two car drivers heading towards each other from opposite direction. If no one swerves, result is fatal head-on collision causing death, or serious injuries. Conversely, if both swerve, there is no collision but also there is no winner. Best scenario for each driver is to stay on course and hope that the other will panic and swerve ("Chicken out"); hence the collision is avoided and the social status of being brave and cool (for the driver who stayed on course) is achieved. This yields a situation where each player, in attempting to secure his best outcome, risks the worst. Alternate Hawk-Dove version of the game involves two players fighting for an indivisible resource. They can use mere threat display (play Dove), or physically attack each other (play Hawk). If both players choose the Hawk strategy, then they fight until one is injured and the other wins. If only one player chooses Hawk, then this player defeats the Dove player. If both players play Dove, there is a tie, and no one can claim the resource in dispute. A chicken game scenario between two states, as in the Cuban Missile Crisis, runs the risk of preemptive strikes. The Hobbesian trap (or Schelling's dilemma) is a theory that explains why preemptive strikes occur between two groups. A common example is the dilemma that both the armed burglar and the armed homeowner face when they meet each other. Both sides are armed only to threaten, and neither may want to shoot and escalate the situation. However, both are afraid of the other party shooting first, and out of bilateral fear of an imminent attack they may be tempted to fire first. Although the favorable outcome for both parties would be that nobody be shot, fear and mutual distrust between the actors increase the likelihood of a preemptive strike. In the cold-war era, the United States Government stated with great emphasis that it will never initiate a nuclear war, but this statement is subject to a qualification. Both Britain and the United States said that, if Russia makes a non-nuclear attack upon any NATO country, the West will retaliate with nuclear weapons. Even today, after the declaration of the No first use policy (for nuclear weapons) by countries like China and India, The United States and Russia reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first.
The famous British philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell had an odd roll to play in this crisis. He liked to express his candid opinion by writing off letters to editors of the newspapers and even head of the states. He felt that United States was in wrong. If Cuba agreed with Soviets to build bases, the United States had no moral right to oppose. He previously had published open letters on disarmament and this time he warned of nuclear war. He also sent telegrams to world leaders including Kennedy and Khrushchev. He was harsh on Kennedy but more sympathetic towards Khrushchev. Opinions are unclear if Russel's letters and telegrams had any effect on the course of the events. However, by his harsh attitude towards Kennedy and sympathetic attitude towards Khrushchev provided the Soviet leader the opportunity to appear more reasonable than his opponent. He offered Khrushchev a face-saving excuse to deescalate the crisis. Importance of face-saving excuse cannot be emphasized enough in a stand-off situation. Intervention by a neutral entity, or downplay by the successful opposition gives an easy exit to the losing side, instead of compelling to escalate the conflict further. On October 26, the State Department started receiving a message that appeared to be written personally by Khrushchev. Robert F. Kennedy described the letter as "very long and emotional." Emissaries sent by both Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev agreed to meet at the Yenching Palace Chinese restaurant in the Cleveland Park neighborhood of Washington D.C. on the evening of October 27. As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged and Kennedy was slowly persuaded. Finally On October 27, after much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy secretly agreed to remove all missiles set in southern Italy and in Turkey in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in Cuba.
Coming back to the more interesting aspect of the crisis -chicken game, what rational strategy can be advised in such circumstances? Obviously, sensible decision is to yield. Status, honour, or a valuable resource is not an enough reason to risk serious injuries or lives, common sense would warn you. However, the same rational option turns irrational if you face similar situation recurrently. It is apparent that an irrational player has an advantage in chicken game. If "rational" option selected again and again, you appear coward and a soft target for bullying. Subservient status not only erodes human dignity, it puts you at a disadvantage in subsequent social interactions. How can one overcome such a position? One tactic is to occasionally play crazy, and eliminate the "rational" option in the beginning. Let’s go back to the scenario of chicken game played by two car drivers. Just before both cars are signalled to head towards each other, suppose one player takes out the steering wheel and throws it away. Though surprised, second player soon realizes that now the first player can't swerve even if he wishes. Such crazy action will force the second player to yield. In many prison systems, where pecking-order depends on dominant status, one of the few ways to earn respect and peace for a new-comer is to act crazy but courageous in initial confrontations. Second tactic, more of a preventive nature than the first one, is to threaten action with genuine emotions -which lends conviction to your words. For example, a farmer must deter his neighbour from letting cattle stray into his wheat; yet the threat of a lawsuit is not credible because the cost would outweigh the value of the damage done. The neighbour, after hearing the farmer’s threat, fences in his cattle knowing that the farmer's rage and obstinacy will cause him to sue even if it means ruining himself in the process. Emotions lend credibility to our irrational commitment. Our emotions will lose credibility if verbal commitment is not followed by action though. The key to understanding Robert Frank's theory of the emotions is to keep in mind this distinction between superficial irrationality and ultimate good sense. Emotions are profoundly irrational forces that cannot be explained by material self-interest. Yet they have evolved, like everything else in human nature, for a purpose. Human beings who let emotions rather than rationality govern their lives may be making immediate sacrifices, but in long term, are making choices that benefit their long term well-being. Moral sentiments are a way of settling the conflict between short-term expediency and long-term prudence in favour of the latter.
References:
- Bertrand Russell, "Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare"
- Matt Ridley, "The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation"
- William Poundstone, "Prisoner's Dilemma"
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pre-emptive_nuclear_strike
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_first_use
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_%28game%29
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hobbesian_trap
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