The IAF's recent announcement that it is prepared to induct an additional 80 Tejas aircraft, over and above the 40 that it committed to buy earlier, has generated a lot of discussion in the press and on social media.               

It has been widely reported that the imperative to order additional Tejas, despite the shortcomings of the aircraft in weapon load, range and maneuverability; comes from an urgency to check the IAF's depleting squadron strength. Depending on how you count, the IAF is 7 to 9 squadrons short, of its authorized fighter squadron strength of 44. The authorized squadron strength is based on a rather dated assessment of what the IAF would require to hold its own in a two front collusive war with China and Pakistan. Many analysts and defense enthusiasts have welcomed the IAF's decision to augment its squadron strength with the underwhelming, but home built, Tejas; while many others have panned it because of the decision's possible adverse impact on alternative procurement pathways such as additional Rafales, alternative MMRCA, LCA Mk-2 and AMCA. The naysayers fear that the decision could end up enfeebling the IAF in the long run, since it would impose a budgetary constraint on the induction of more capable fighters.

The discourse and discussions on the subject have been skewed because media and analysts have ignored two very important facets germane to the issue. Firstly, even as the IAF's squadron strength has been depleting with the phasing out of MiG-21 Bis and MiG-27 fighters, the IAF's overall strike power has been increasing, with the induction of Su-30MKI, MiG-29UPG, Mirage-2000I and Jaguar Upgrade. For example, a Su-30MKI probably is equivalent to 4 MiG-21 Bis aircraft in terms of strike power. The IAF already has 10 Su-30MKI squadrons, with more in the pipeline! No one can or has ever claimed that the IAF's strike power today is less than what it was 5, 10, or 15 years back.

Secondly, a two front war is a doomsday scenario in the realm of the possible, but not the probable. Future wars between India and its adversaries are expected to be short and sharp and heavily localized. India and both its potential adversaries are nuclear armed. Any large scale war would lower the nuclear threshold precipitously. A two front collusive war...really?

Strike Power vs Aircraft Numbers

The potency of an Air Force is dependent on its overall strike power, not the number of combat aircraft in its inventory. The IAF and USAF saw little threat from the PLAAF when it was equipped with thousands of lightly armed MiGs. Today, with just 600 modern fighters, the PLAAF is considered a dangerous adversary by both the countries. The strike power of an Air Force depends on the collective strike power of its combat aircraft and availability of ISR (satellite and airborne), AWACS, and communication assets which facilitate effective targeting. Combat aircraft strike power in turn is a measure of how much havoc the aircraft can wreak on the adversary in a day, and how deep it can strike into adversary territory. An aircraft's strike power depends on its maximum weapon load, range (with or without aerial refueling), possible weapon mix, pilot comfort, SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense) and EW (Electronic Warfare) capability, and ease of maintenance.

An aircraft's ability to use PGMs (Precision Guided Munition) and refuel in the air are significant force multipliers. So is ease of maintenance, since it reduces turnaround time and effectively adds to aircraft inventory. Use of standoff cruise missiles can enable a combat aircraft to strike deep into enemy territory, eliminating safe havens and adversely impacting the adversary's ability to resupply its troops along battle lines. EW capability secures an aircraft from adversary missile attacks while SEAD allows combat aircraft to safely penetrate contested airspace. Clearly the IAF has means, other than buying new aircraft, to augment its potency, and it has been using these means to enhance its strike power.

The Myth of a Two Front War

Most military analysts consider an all-out war between India and Pakistan as being unlikely. A defining feature of Pakistan's nuclear posture is a lowered nuclear threshold aimed to dissuade a dismembering deep strike in the desert by the Indian Army, a past Indian strategy to discourage Pakistani adventurism in J&K. An Indian response to Pak aggression in J&K would now have to be confined to the state. Similarly, any war with China would probably be localized and aimed at gaining territory to offset any territorial gains by the adversary. A collusive two front all-out war does not appear plausible. It's unlikely that the IAF's decision to buy additional Tejas aircraft was prompted by its depleting fighter strength. The decision is more likely a challenge to the HAL to spruce up the industrial base in the country for manufacturing home built modern fighters. Aircraft builders worldwide design and develop new aircraft around the IP and industrial base that they have developed, or is available within the country. HAL has to do the same. The shamefully prolonged era of assembly from kits must end.

HAL is currently experiencing difficulty in ramping up Tejas production because of its limited IP and industrial base. A long production run with the Tejas should help HAL more quickly produce the LCA Mk-2 and the AMCA, if these two projects get government support. Failure on the part of HAL to deliver the Tejas to the complete satisfaction of the IAF is not an option, as it will put India back to square one. The question is - will the public sector organization finally emerge out of the decadence it has slipped into and embraced for so many decades? While the Tejas' strike power maybe underwhelming by modern standards, it's much greater than the strike power of MiG-21 Bis and perhaps even the MiG-27, factoring in the Tejas' AESA radar, targeting pod integration for effective use of PGMs, and aerial refueling.